True Blue Auctions v. Robert Foster by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-10-2013 
True Blue Auctions v. Robert Foster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"True Blue Auctions v. Robert Foster" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 716. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/716 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2996 
_____________ 
 
TRUE BLUE AUCTIONS;  
WAYNE A. DREIBELBIS, JR., 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
  True Blue Auctions, LLC (“True Blue”) and Wayne A. Dreibelbis, Jr. appeal the 
District Court‟s dismissal of their complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two 
officers of the City of Franklin Police Department.  For the reasons explained herein, we 
will affirm. 
I. 
We write solely for the parties and will therefore recount only those facts that are 
essential to our disposition.  The amended complaint alleges that on October 16, 2009, 
Dreibelbis was conducting an auction on private property in Franklin, Pennsylvania on 
behalf of True Blue.  While Dreibelbis was videotaping the auction, defendants Robert 
Scott Foster and Kevin Lewis (the “officers”), ordered Dreibelbis to remove an auction 
sign that was about seventy-five yards from the auction site.  Dreibelbis left the video 
camera on during the interaction (which took place on a public sidewalk), and the officers 
told him he would be arrested if he did not stop videotaping them.  Dreibelbis stopped 
videotaping at that time, and also “curtailed some of his videotaping the rest of the 
auction that day and the next day because he was concerned he would be arrested for 
doing so.”  Appendix (“App.”) 20.   
  The plaintiffs filed suit alleging that in threatening to arrest Dreibelbis for 
videotaping, the officers violated their First Amendment rights.  The officers moved to 
dismiss the amended complaint, arguing in part that they were entitled to qualified 
immunity.  The Magistrate Judge agreed, explaining in her Report and Recommendation 
that “[g]iven the uncertainty in the case law and the lack of authority from the Third 
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Circuit, this Court is unable to rule as a matter of law that there was a clearly established 
right to videotape a police officer at the time Defendants instructed Plaintiff to stop 
videotaping them.”  App. 12.  The District Court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation as its opinion and dismissed the case.  The plaintiffs now appeal.   
II.
1
 
  The only issue we must determine on appeal is whether the District Court 
correctly concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore 
could not be subject to liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In determining 
whether to apply qualified immunity, “we ask:  (1) whether the facts alleged by the 
plaintiff show the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the law was clearly 
established at the time of the violation.”  Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 
(3d Cir. 2010).  In the process of determining whether a right was clearly established, we 
“must consider the state of the existing law at the time of the alleged violation and the 
circumstances confronting the officer to determine whether a reasonable state actor could 
have believed his conduct was lawful.”  Id.2   Thus, we must determine whether the 
Magistrate Judge was correct to conclude that as of October 16, 2009,  Dreibelbis had no 
clearly established constitutional right to videotape the officers without threat of arrest.    
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of a district court‟s 
order granting a motion to dismiss.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d 
Cir. 2009). 
2
 In 2009, the Supreme Court held that it is permissible for a district court to assess 
whether the law is clearly established before deciding if a constitutional right has been 
violated at all.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
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  The Report and Recommendation relied principally on Kelly, a 2010 case 
addressing an issue similar to the one we face today.  In that case, a police officer pulled 
over a car for a routine traffic stop.  The plaintiff was riding in the passenger seat and 
recorded the stop with a small handheld video camera held in his lap.  622 F.3d at 251.  
The officer noticed the camera and then went back to the patrol car to call an assistant 
district attorney to obtain advice on whether he could arrest Kelly for violation of the 
Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act.  After being advised 
that an arrest was appropriate, the officer arrested Kelly.  Id. at 252.  Kelly brought 
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the Fourth and First Amendments.  At the 
outset, we explained that “[w]e have not addressed directly the right to videotape police 
officers.”  Id. at 260.  We also reiterated our previous comment that “videotaping or 
photographing the police in the performance of their duties on public property may be a 
protected activity.”  Id. (emphasis added in Kelly) (quoting Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 
212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005)).  Though acknowledging that “[i]n determining whether a right 
is clearly established, it is not necessary that the exact set of factual circumstances has 
been considered previously,” id. at 259, we surveyed case law from various courts and 
concluded that there was no clearly established right to videotape police officers during a 
traffic stop.  Id. at 262.   
  First, the plaintiffs argue that even if Kelly held that there was no clearly 
established right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop, there was nevertheless 
a clearly established right to tape police officers on a public sidewalk during the course of 
their duties.  Pl. Br. 12-13 (citing Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262 (distinguishing other First 
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Amendment cases based on inherently dangerous nature of traffic stops)).
3
  Even if the 
distinction between traffic stops and public sidewalk confrontations is as meaningful as 
the plaintiffs claim, such that Kelly is not dispositive, the plaintiffs are simply incorrect in 
claiming that “[e]very court has ruled there is a First Amendment right to videotape 
police in non-traffic stops situations in public forums.”  Pl. Br. 23.  Instead, as Kelly 
clearly explained, courts have come to divergent conclusions on the issue.    
  The district court in Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Pa. 2005), 
addressed a situation in which a plaintiff had been arrested for videotaping state troopers 
performing truck inspections.  Noting that “[v]ideotaping is a legitimate means of 
gathering information for public dissemination,” the court held that “there can be no 
doubt that the free speech clause of the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped 
the defendants.”  Id. at 541. 
  Yet district courts in our circuit have several times come to the opposite 
conclusion.  For instance, in Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 
504 (D.N.J. 2006), the plaintiff had been arrested for stalking after taking photographs of 
town officials, and the court denied the defendants‟ summary judgment motion after 
finding sufficient evidence that the photographs were taken based on public concern.  Yet 
in response to the plaintiff‟s “blanket assertion” that observation of public officials is 
                                              
3
 The plaintiffs also devote much of their argument to the Kelly district court‟s opinion 
entered after the case was remanded, see  Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 815 F. Supp. 2d 
810 (M.D. Pa. 2011), arguing that unlike with a traffic stop, there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy on a public sidewalk.  The argument is inapposite — because our 
Court had already determined the First Amendment question, the district court‟s second 
opinion addressed only the plaintiff‟s Fourth Amendment claim.   
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protected by the First Amendment, “[t]he Court [did] not necessarily agree,” arguing that 
“the act of photographing, in the abstract, is not sufficiently expressive or communicative 
and therefore not within the scope of First Amendment protection—even when the 
subject of the photography is a public servant.”  Id. at 513 n.14 (also reiterating the 
Court‟s statement in Gilles that videotaping “may be a protected activity”); see also  
Snyder v. Daugherty, 899 F. Supp. 2d 391, 413-14 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (“There is no clearly 
established, „unfettered‟ constitutional right, in generalized terms, under the First, Fourth, 
or any other Amendment, to record police officers in the performance of their duties.”). 
  Thus, our case law does not clearly establish a right to videotape police officers 
performing their official duties such that the officers here should have been on notice that 
Dreibelbis had a First Amendment right to film them.  Accordingly, the District Court 
correctly concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.   
III. 
  For the reasons explained above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
